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Abstract
It is a widely acknowledged result of the literature on capital tax competition that
underprovision of public goods can only be avoided if tax coordination between
governments is intensive and residence-based capital taxation can be enforced.
In this paper we use a model where commodity and factor taxes are available
and we show that governments competing for tax bases will choose a globally
eﬃcient tax structure. In contrast to previous conclusions, we also show that the
availability of a destination-based commodity tax or a labor tax is necessary to
mitigate the problem of ineﬃcient Nash equilibria and thus reduces the necessity
of supranational tax harmonization or coordination.
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The past two decades are characterized by a rapid increase of international capital
mobility that raised concerns worldwide about the sustainability of capital income tax-
ation. Distortions of economic activities caused due to ﬁscal competition have led to
numerous calls for international tax coordination to eliminate ”unfair tax competi-
tion” [cf. European Commission (1998)]. However, tax coordination measures may be
hampered by lacking incentives, since countries are required to support the collection
of revenues that beneﬁt their neighbor countries. Moreover, isolated measures in an
economic union, as for example the EU, generally have little or no eﬀect in the pres-
ence of a world-wide capital market. Hence, the relevant policy question is whether
tax competition is harmful and a global (second-best) optimum is only attainable by
tax coordination measures. This paper extends the previous literature on capital tax
competition and considers the tax competition equilibrium with factor taxes and com-
modity taxes. We show in one scenario that the inclusion of commodity taxes is able
to eliminate the suboptimal provision of public goods even in the absence of residence-
based capital taxation, but only if wage taxation is possible. However, in realistic
(second-best) scenarios either destination-based commodity taxation or wage taxation
and a residence-based capital tax must be available to decentralize a second-best allo-
cation.
One of the general results of the literature on commodity tax competition on the
one hand and the capital tax competition literature on the other hand is that govern-
ments engaged in international tax competition choose ineﬃciently low origin-based
commodity taxes or source-based capital taxes. Ineﬃciency occurs since competition
in origin-based commodity taxes or source-based capital taxes creates an externality on
tax revenue in other countries [cf. Mintz and Tulkens (1986), Razin and Sadka (1991)].
In contrast to competition on private markets, competition between countries for mo-
bile tax bases distorts the incentive of government to eﬃciently provide public goods
[cf. Sinn (1997)].
The literature on capital tax competition has proposed several solutions to over-
come the ineﬃciencies caused by decentral ﬁscal decision-making. One obvious solution
is to tax capital income at a harmonized rate according to the source principle. How-
ever, source-based capital taxes lead to capital ﬂight and only a worldwide agreement
would create substantial eﬃciency gains [cf. Sørensen (1999), Mintz (1999)]. A second
solution, based on Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991), is to rigorously enforce the residence
principle.
1In principle, open borders create similar problems in collection of destination-based
taxes which can be undermined by cross-border shopping [cf. Mintz and Tulkens
(1986)]. However, empirical evidence shows that the downward pressure on commodity
taxation due to cross-border shopping is relatively weak [cf. FitzGerald, Johnston and
Williams (1995), Ratzinger (1998)].
Whereas there exists an extensive literature on both capital and commodity tax
competition much less work has been done to combine both strands. Hauﬂer (1996)
studies the mix between destination and origin-based commodity and source-based cap-
ital taxes in a speciﬁc factor model with international capital mobility, but he excludes
residence-based capital and wage taxation, since they would be lump-sum under the
assumption that world endowment of production factors is ﬁxed. Genser and Hauﬂer
(1996) discuss the interaction between factor and commodity taxes in a framework with
imperfectly mobile ﬁrms and consumers and conclude that a destination-based com-
modity tax dominates an origin-based commodity tax if a wage tax and a proﬁt tax are
applied. However, both papers do not address the normative question whether taxes
are set eﬃciently and are thus not comparable to the literature cited above. Richter
(2000) studies the eﬀects of decentralized commodity taxation in a Tiebout framework
with mobile ﬁrms and households. The basic insight that consumption taxation is
generally preferable to taxes on production parallels a result of the present analysis
which, however, focuses on the eﬀects of taxes on factor supply decisions.
The main conclusion of this paper is that public goods are provided eﬃciently
when governments have access to a destination-based commodity tax and a residence-
based capitale tax. This result is robust with respect to model extensions. Decentral
ﬁscal decisions also do not cause international ﬁscal externalities when additionally an
origin-based commodity tax and a source-based capital tax are in the set of available
tax instruments.
However, the model also corroborates the result of previous literature that public
goods are provided eﬃciently when a residence-based capital tax and a wage tax are
simultaneously available for governments. To pinpoint the tax assumption responsible
for ineﬃcient tax setting we additionally consider the case when the wage tax is not
available and replicate Bucovetsky and Wilson’s (1991) conclusion that an eﬃcient
provision of public goods can be obtained by double-taxation of capital. But it is shown
that this result is sensitive to model extensions. Eﬃciency can no longer be obtained,
even in the presence of a residence-based capital tax if an origin-based commodity tax
is available as a third tax instrument. The intuition for this puzzling result is that tax
2competition in these three taxes leaves room for harmful tax competition and creates
ﬁscal externalities, whereas tax competition in two taxes does not.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section 2 introduces the model.
Tax regimes without a destination-based commodity tax are considered in section 3.
Tax competition in scenarios with a destination-based commodity tax are analyzed in
section 4. Section 5 gives our conclusions.
2 The Model
The analysis uses a two-period model of symmetric tax competition between identical
small countries which compete on international capital and commodity markets and
take as given world prices for capital and the consumption good. In contrast to previous
contributions, which consider either capital tax or commodity tax competition, our
objective is to focus on the interaction between factor and commodity taxation in
an international setting. We hence consider a set of ﬁve diﬀerent taxes: an origin-
based commodity tax, a destination-based commodity tax, a source-based capital tax,
a residence-based capital tax and a wage tax. Let R denote the given world interest
rate, w the gross wage, r the gross interest rate and normalize the world price of the
universal commodity to unity. Producer and consumer prices of the commodity in the
small country are determined by the world price of unity and the tax rates chosen by
the government. Taxation introduces the following wedges
t
o = 1 − p origin-based commodity tax,
t
d = q − 1 destination-based commodity tax,
t
s = r − R source-based capital tax, (1)
t
r = R − ρ residence-based capital tax,
t
w = w − ω wage tax.
In (1) variable p is the national producer price and q is the national consumer price of
the commodity. Variables ρ and ω denote the net interest rate and the wage rate, both
net of taxes. Governments set taxes at the beginning of the ﬁrst period, which remain
valid in both periods.
We wish to provide a framework simple as possible in which factor and commodity
taxation can be analyzed. First, turn to the production side. Production takes place
under conditions of perfect competition with a strictly concave and constant returns-
to-scale production technology f (ki,li), where ki and li are capital and labor inputs in
3periods i ∈ {1,2}.1 Applying the implicit-function theorem to the zero-proﬁt condition
p f (ki,li)−[1 + r] ki −w li = 0 and using the ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal factor






















where derivatives here and in the following are denoted by subscripts, and the last line
in (2) holds as an application of Young’s theorem. Notice that (2) links the gross wage
to the equilibrium level of per-capita investment and per-capita production.
The representative consumer in each country maximizes a well-behaved utility
function u(ci,li;g). Variable ci denotes consumption and li labor supply in periods
i ∈ {1,2}, g is the provision level of a national public good.2 The time structure of the
model is as follows. The consumer receives an endowment in the ﬁrst period which can
either be consumed or invested in a universal ﬁnancial asset. In period 2, the consumer
receives the principal plus interest income. The consumer supplies labor endogenously
in both periods and, thus, the consolidated budget constraint is
[1 + ρ][e + ωl1] + ωl2 − q [c2 + [1 + ρ]c1] = 0, (3a)
e + ωl1 + ˜ ωl2 − qc1 − ˜ qc2 = 0, (3b)
where ˜ q := q/[1 + ρ] and ˜ ω := ω/[1 + ρ]. Inspection of (3a) shows that td and tw leave
unaﬀected the price ratio between ﬁrst and second period consumption and, hence, both
taxes do not allow to control the savings decision of residents. Maximizing the direct
utility function u(ci,li;g) w.r.t. (3) yields the Marshallian functions ci (q,ω,ρ,e) :=
˜ ci (q, ˜ q,ω, ˜ ω,e) and li (q,ω,ρ,e) := ˜ li (q, ˜ q,ω, ˜ ω,e). The Marshallians and the direct
utility function deﬁne the indirect utility function v (q,ω,ρ,e;g). Recall from (3b) that,
1 We can suppress the time index in the wage rate w due to international factor-price equalization.
Rewriting the zero-proﬁt condition in per capita terms yields pf(ki)−wi−[1+r]ki = 0, with ki = Ki/Li
and r deﬁned in (1). Diﬀerentiating w.r.t. ki we obtain ﬁrst-order condition pfki = 1+r for the ﬁrm.
The ﬁrst-order condition and (1) imply k1 = k2, given world return to capital R. Moreover, from
wi = pfki − pfkiki, the gross wage is linked to k1 = k2 thus w1 = w2.
2 The utility function is separable between public and private consumption. This speciﬁcation,
indicated by semicolon, simpliﬁes the exposition but has no implication for our results.
4as an implication of utility maximization, Marshallian functions are homogeneous of
degree 0 in q, ˜ q,ω, ˜ ω and e
q˜ ciq + ˜ q˜ ci˜ q + ω˜ ciω + ˜ ω˜ ci˜ ω + e˜ cie = 0 ∀i ∈ {1,2}, (4a)
q˜ liq + ˜ q˜ li˜ q + ω˜ liω + ˜ ω˜ li˜ ω + e˜ lie = 0 ∀i ∈ {1,2}. (4b)
Using the chain rule to diﬀerentiate ci (q,ω,ρ,e) and li (q,ω,ρ,e) w.r.t. q,ω and using
the resulting expressions in (4) shows
qliq + ωliω + elie = 0 ∀i ∈ {1,2}, (5a)
qciq + ωciω + ecie = 0 ∀i ∈ {1,2}. (5b)
According to (5), a proportional increase in q,ω and e leaves consumption unaﬀected.
Hence, the consumption tax td is equivalent to a tax on wage income tw plus a tax
on capital endowment levied at the rate td/

1 + td
, a result that is also obtained by
dividing (3a) through q = 1 + td.
The government maximizes utility of the representative resident v (q,ω,ρ,e;g) sub-
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We deﬁne c := c1 [1 + R] + c2 and l := l1 [1 + R] + l2 for notational simplicity and
substituting out for f (ki,li) and ki using (2) in (6) to obtain the Lagrangian
L = v (q,ω,ρ,e;g) + λ
h
g − t





In (7) variable λ denotes the Lagrange parameter and α := towp (p,r)+tw −tswr (p,r)
can be interpreted as the eﬀective tax on labor income. Normalizing the marginal
utility of private income to unity we can now derive the ﬁrst-order conditions of the
optimization problem using Roy’s identity, the tax deﬁnitions in (1) and the symmetry
of the model, which implies that, in each country, savings e − c + wl must equal the
equilibrium level of capital investment k and ci = f (ki,li). After diﬀerentiation of the
5consumption functions we can use equations (2) to substitute out for k and f (ki,li) to
obtain the following set of ﬁrst-order conditions
Ltw = −β + λ
h
− l + t




Ltr = βwr + λ
h
lwr + t
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Lts = βwr + λ
h
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Lto = −βwp + λ
h
t









Lg = vg + λ = 0, (8f)
where we deﬁned β := l1 [1 + ρ] + l2, which denotes aggregated labor supply in terms
of the second period, and we used (5) and the deﬁnition given after (6) to substitute
out for cq,lq,ciq and liq in (8c). Tax policy in the Nash equilibrium is determined by
ﬁrst-order conditions (8) and the government budget (6). In the following sections we
consider tax scenarios which diﬀer in the set of available taxes. If the government has
only a restricted set of taxes available, the corresponding ﬁrst-order condition of the
missing tax is discarded and the tax rate is set zero in the other ﬁrst-order conditions.
It will prove helpful for the following analysis to make use of the Slutsky relationship
between Marshallian and Hicksian functions. Let us denote Hicksian compensated
functions by superscript c. Since countries are symmetric, k = s holds in each period
and we obtain
φi = kiliω − li liρ = ki l
c










∀i ∈ {1,2}, (9)
ψi = kiciω − li ciρ = ki c
c










∀i ∈ {1,2}, (10)
where both φi > 0 and ψi > 0 under the assumption that consumption is a Hicksian
substitute with leisure. We again make use of the terminology introduced above and
deﬁne φ := φ1 + [1 + R]φ2 and φ := φ1 + [1 + R]φ2 in the following for notational
simplicity.
3 Tax competition without destination-based taxes
First consider the case in which each government is constrained to impose source-based
taxes: a tax on wage income, a source-based capital and an origin-based commodity
6tax. Since the destination-based commodity tax and the residence-based tax on capital
income are zero, the consumer price is equal to the world price q = 1 and the net interest
rate is equal to the world interest rate ρ = R. We show that, under this scenario of tax
competition, taxes are set ineﬃciently in the Nash equilibrium. To prove this result
we ﬁrst solve the model for the nationally optimal tax rates:
Proposition 1. The source-based capital tax and the origin-based commodity tax are
zero in the Nash equilibrium and the wage tax is the only source of government revenue.
Proof. The tax structure in the Nash equilibrium is determined by relevant ﬁrst-order
conditions (8a), (8d) and (8e). We obtain
Lts = −wr Ltw − λ[t
olwrp − t
slwrr] = 0, (11)
Lto = wp Ltw + λ[t
olwpp − t
slwrp] = 0. (12)
With tw chosen optimally by governments in the Nash equilibrium, Ltw = 0 in (11)
and (12). For λ < 0 [from (8f)] the only solution of (11) and (12) is to = ts = 0.
Observe that the wage tax is used to meet the budget requirement in (6). 
The message of Proposition 1 is that production taxes which reduce the return on an
internationally mobile factor of production should not levied in a small open economy,
given the existence of a tax on an internationally immobile factor, however inelastic the
immobile factor is in supply. Proposition 1 reproduces the results from the previous
literature on capital tax competition that source-based capital taxes should not levied
when unrestricted wage taxation is possible [Razin and Sadka (1991), Huizinga and
Nielsen (1997)], and shows that this conclusion is also valid in the presence of an
origin-based commodity tax [Hauﬂer (1996)]. If production taxes are zero, then the
marginal rate of substitution between public and private goods equals the marginal
resource costs in the production of the public good and the economy is on the [perceived]
consumption possibility frontier. The tax structure given by (11) and (12) is nationally
eﬃcient, given the additional constraint that the international capital market imposes
on the optimization problem of the government. However, the tax structure in the
Nash equilibrium generally must not be eﬃcient from a global perspective since the
slope of the perceived consumption possibility frontier must not coincide with the slope
of world’s consumption possibility frontier.
This brings us to the normative issue whether the tax structure in the Nash equi-
librium also is globally eﬃcient. The next Proposition establishes that the Nash equi-
librium is globally ineﬃcient, given the available taxes.
7Proposition 2. Starting from the Nash equilibrium, national utility can be increased,
if wage taxation, origin-based commodity taxation and source-based capital taxation is
coordinated internationally.
Proof. Suppose, starting from the symmetric Nash equilibrium with tax rates given
by (11) and (12), a social planner aims at increasing utility through a simultaneous
change of taxes in all countries. From symmetry, the problem is fully described by (7).
In contrast to national authorities, however, the global social planner takes into account
the eﬀects of tax coordination on R. Diﬀerentiating (7) we obtain the following set of
ﬁrst-order conditions for the social planner
Lti
 





From (8a), (8d) and (8e) follows that, starting from the Nash equilibrium, coordination
has a zero ﬁrst-order impact on utility, thus Lti = 0 in (13). But a coordinated change in
taxes has an eﬀect on the equilibrium level of R, aﬀecting utility by the induced change
in consumption. This second-order eﬀect is given by terms LRRti. As inspection of
condition (13) shows, the social planner will only be unable to increase utility if LR = 0
already as a consequence of tax competition. We form LR, substitute out liρ and ciρ







Recalling λ < 0 from (8f), the deﬁnition of α given below (7) and tw > 0,ts = to = 0
from Proposition 1 we see that LR 6= 0 in the Nash equilibrium as required by the
Proposition. 
The explanation for the result of ineﬃcient tax setting in the Nash equilibrium
is based on two observations. (i) First, since there is no motive for trade in the
model due to symmetry, the best coordinated policy can do is to replicate the closed-
economy equilibrium, in which no distinction exists between a source-based capital
tax and a residence-based capital tax on the one hand, and between an origin-based
commodity tax and a destination-based commodity tax on the other hand. Hence,
under coordination, the government in a given country has a full set of optimal taxes
available, implying that there exists one tax instrument for each price in the consumer’s
budget constraint, hence to 6= 0 and ts 6= 0. Since both taxes fall on consumption under
coordination, they both are used to ensure that the world economy is on the world
consumption possibility frontier. (ii) Secondly, the assumption of identical countries
is useful to abstract from issues of an optimal international income distribution, but
8is not a simpliﬁcation if such issues are taken aside. Despite the fact that there is
no motive for trade in the model, a government competing for tax bases perceives
that taxes aﬀect the international resource allocation. This is the crucial factor in
the government’s best response function [cf. Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson
(1986) and Wildasin (1989)]. In an open economy, source-based capital and origin-
based commodity taxes are, however, no longer equivalent to taxes that directly aﬀect
consumer prices. Hence, those taxes are not used under tax competition, but they
should be used from global eﬃciency. To sum up, there is a welfare gain from tax
coordination, if countries compete for mobile tax bases and have to rely on origin-
based commodity, source-based capital and wage taxation.
Tax competition with residence-based capital taxes
The results and the intuition given above may appear conﬂicting with the results
of Bucovetsky and Wilson (sec. 4) who prove that the tax competition equilibrium,
in which only source-based and residence-base capital taxes exist, is eﬃcient. The
important lesson of Bucovetsky and Wilson is that the absence of a wage tax must not
cause ineﬃciently low levels of taxation, but the absence of a residence-based capital tax
will cause such an ineﬃciency. Although our model framework departs from Bucovetsky
and Wilson since we also have a labor supply decision in the ﬁrst period, we can shortly
reproduce their conclusion in order to describe the relation between their result and
the results in the present paper. Let us turn to their tax scenario and therefore assume
that only the two capital taxes ts and tr exist. We rewrite (8d) using (9), (10) and (8b)
as
Lts = Ltr − λ

t








A government will choose tr as to fulﬁll Ltr = 0. To determine the chances of an
increase in utility from coordination we proceed as in the proof of Proposition 2 and
get from the ﬁrst-order condition of the global planner
LR = t








It is straightforward to check that the nationally optimal tax structure (15) implies
LR = 0. Hence, the symmetric Nash equilibrium in source-based and residence-based
capital taxes is eﬃcient. A coordinated tax change will not increase utility and this is
Bucovetsky and Wilson’s (1991, sec. 4) result.
9The economic intuition behind is that the source-based capital tax is a strategic
substitute for the missing wage tax. To conﬁrm this intuition analytically consider the
eﬀects of introducing a wage tax as an additional third tax instrument.
Proposition 3. If source-based capital taxes, residence-based capital taxes and wage
taxes are available, then the resulting Nash equilibrium is eﬃcient and ts = 0.
Proof. We rewrite ﬁrst-order condition (8d)
Lts = −wr Ltw + t
sλlwrr = 0, (17)
where we assumed that both capital taxes and the wage tax are chosen nationally
optimal. From (17) follows that the source-based capital tax is zero in the Nash
equilibrium. Using ts = 0 and (9)-(10) we form wrLtw + Ltr and obtain the tax
structure in the Nash equilibrium
t
wφ = t
r [ψ − wφ]. (18)
Next, we evaluate LR, substitute out liρ and ciρ using (9) and (10). Applying (18) in
the resulting expression to substitute out for tw and tr shows LR = 0. Thus an increase
in utility is not possible as required by the Proposition. 
Evidently, the source-based capital tax will not be used when the government has
a direct tax which controls the margin of substitution in the utility function. However,
eﬃciency under both tax regimes, with or without a wage tax, does not imply that
the wage tax is not required. Constrained eﬃciency in the Bucovetsky and Wilson
world simply tells us that coordination does not improve the competitive equilibrium.
With wage taxes in the tax policy toolkit, national welfare will be higher in the Nash
equilibrium, although still constrained, and the production tax ts is no longer needed,
since the wage tax directly controls the margin of substitution without distorting pro-
duction eﬃciency. As an implication, eﬃciency in the scenario when only tr,ts are
available requires that wage taxation is internationally harmonized at level tw = 0. To
shed further light on the scope of the Bucovetsky and Wilson result it is instructive
to investigate next how sensitive the result of a globally eﬃcient equilibrium in capital
taxes is.
We argue that the result is not robust with respect to the introduction of an origin-
based commodity tax as a third tax instrument.
Proposition 4. If source-based capital taxes, residence-based capital taxes and origin-
based commodity taxes are available, but not wage taxation, then the resulting Nash
equilibrium is ineﬃcient.
10Proof. The proof involves two steps. First, we describe the tax structure in the Nash
equilibrium. We form Lts − Ltr and use (9)-(10) to obtain
t






which isolates those eﬀects of the source-based capital tax that cannot replicated by
the residence-based capital tax. Of course, (19) coincides with (15) for to = 0. Next,
we form wp Ltr + wr Lto, use (9)-(10) and yield
t






which isolates those eﬀects of the residence-based capital tax that are not replicated
by the origin-based commodity tax. In the second step we the identify whether the
tax structure in the Nash equilibrium is compatible with global eﬃciency and evalu-
ate LR = 0. Solving the resulting expression for ts and using (9)-(10) shows
t






We can then compare (19) with (21) and ﬁnd both are equal. However, (20) and (21)
do not coincide. Since both (19) and (20) are fulﬁlled with strict equality in the Nash
equilibrium, the tax structure obtained in a competitive environment is not compatible
with global eﬃciency as postulated by the Proposition. 
The explanation for the result of Proposition 4 is that the government cannot control
factor supply decisions of residents in the presence of both production taxes. Above, we
argued that the source-based capital tax acts as a strategic substitute for the missing
wage tax when the origin-based commodity tax is absent. In contrast, if the origin-
based commodity tax is available, then the source-based capital tax loosens its function
as an implicit tax on wages. The intuition is that the origin-based commodity tax is
equivalent to a tax that falls on wages and the return of domestic capital investment.
Thus, ts looses its role as an indirect tax on wage income and Proposition 4 shows that
this role cannot be adopted by to. The implication is that countries do not have the
necessary set of tax instruments available to independently control labor and capital
supply and engage in wasteful tax competition. Tax competition leads to an ineﬃcient
use of taxes, even in the presence of residence-based capital taxation.
The puzzling lesson of Proposition 4 is that a richer set of instruments can lead
to an ineﬃcient use of taxes. This may appear to contradict the basic insight from
second-best theory that the introduction of an additional tax instrument, which is used
in the optimum, will increase welfare of residents. However, one should be careful to
11interpret Proposition 4 this way. In contrast, the basic message is that a richer set of
tax instruments does not necessarily eliminate the incentives for countries to engage
in wasteful tax competition, even if such strategic incentives do not exist with a less
extensive set of tax instruments. The argument here is that the introduction of to does
not lower utility compared to the utility level achieved in the Bucovetsky and Wilson
world, but utility is higher under coordination when to is in the set of available taxes.
The conclusion hence is that there exist situations in which tax coordination becomes
useful when additional tax instruments are introduced. In the ﬁscal scenario analyzed,
double taxation of capital income does not eliminate the negative consequences of tax
competition in the presence of an origin-based commodity tax.
4 Tax competition with destination-based taxes
The previous section ruled out destination-based commodity taxation. We can now
complete our analysis of diﬀerent tax scenarios by introducing destination-based com-
modity taxation. The tax scenarios considered here are interesting for two reasons. The
VAT in the European Union is a tax on consumption raised according to the Common-
Market Principle, which indeed is a hybrid system that has elements of both the origin
and the destination principle. Lockwood, de Meza and Myles (1994) show, however,
that a consumption-type origin-based tax (i.e. purchases of intermediate goods and
capital inputs are deductible from the tax base) and destination-based consumption
taxation are equivalent in our framework with one production good. Hence, we can
understand td as a comprehensive approximation of the system of commodity taxation
in practice.
Turning to factor taxation, the source-based capital tax replicates some properties of
a more sophisticated corporate income tax and most commentators agree that portfolio
capital is eﬀectively taxed at source due to the missing mutual assistance between tax
administrators. It hence is an interesting task to analyze the eﬀects of destination-
based commodity taxes in a tax competition framework in which, among other taxes,
also source-based capital taxes exist and to relate our discussion to the results we
obtained in the previous section.
It will prove helpful for the analytical discussion to introduce a ﬁctious (lump-sum)
tax on capital endowment te = [1 + ρ] − e. This tax is ﬁctious since it should not be
understood as an independent instrument. We will subsequently show, however, that
one can synthetically design the lump-sum tax by use of distortionary taxation. Adding
12the tax yield of te to the budget constraint (6) in the Lagrangian (7) we straightforward
obtain the ﬁrst-order condition
Lte = −1 + λ
h
− 1 + t
dce − t
r [le − ce] + αle
i
= 0. (22)
We can then use (22) and the ﬁrst-order condition of the wage tax (8a) to rewrite the
ﬁrst-order condition of the destination-based commodity tax (8c) as



















A short inspection of (23) reveals that the government can use the destination-based
commodity and the wage tax to synthetically design a lump-sum tax on the initial en-
dowment te. Of course, this result is suggestive from the description of the equivalence
properties of taxes in section 2 above. From (23) immediately follows that a ﬁrst-best
allocation is compatible with decentral ﬁscal decisions if wage taxes and destination-
based commodity taxes are available and the tax base of the non-distortionary element
of td is suﬃciently large to ﬁnance public good provision, i.e. that net capital en-
dowment e = [1 + ρ] − te > 0 in the optimum. In this case the destination-based
commodity tax and the wage tax are eﬃciency generating complements. To see this
analytically note that a ﬁrst-best allocation requires that Lte = 0 and λ = −1 hold
simultaneously, since the shadow price of tax revenue equals the marginal utility of
private income (normalized to equal one) with non-distortionary taxation. When the
wage tax is optimally set, i.e. Ltw = 0, then λ = −1 and Lte = 0 is compatible with
Ltd = 0. From this argument it is immediately clear that the ﬁrst-best allocation
can be established in tax competition and that the residence-based capital tax is not
needed.
The surprising result that a ﬁrst-best allocation can be decentralized in a world in
which only distorting taxes exists has an intuitive explanation. Both taxes td and tw are
not independent instruments due to the interaction of commodity and factor taxation.
This dependence itself depicts a main argument for the usefulness of wage taxation and
destination-based commodity taxation, since the dependence is constitutional to design
a non-distortionary tax system in which the (second-best) residence-based capital tax
is not necessary to eliminate the negative consequences of tax competition.3 A crucial
question is, however, how large the exogenous income sources e modelled here are in
practice, i.e. how sure it is that e > 0 in the optimum. Sinn (1987, Ch. 11) and
3 Note that not only the residence-based capital tax is not used in the presence of wage taxation and
a destination-based commodity tax. It is also straightforward to show that the source-based capital
tax and the origin-based commodity tax are zero in the presence of a (synthetic) lump-sum tax.
13Frenkel, Razin and Sadka (1991, Ch. 4) for example argue that the capital stock that
is in place at the time when the tax is levied is substantial. If it is true that the tax yield
of the synthetically designed lump-sum tax te is large enough to ﬁnance public good
provision then tax competition is indeed innocent, even in the absence of a residence-
based capital tax. However, one should be careful drawing general policy conclusions
from the above result, since the combination of a wage subsidy and the destination-
based commodity that would reproduce a tax on the initial capital stock is perhaps
unrealistic.
Let us now return to scenarios in which we assume that the government can levy
both td and tw, but assume that the lump-sum element of the destination-based com-
modity tax does not suﬃce to ﬁnance public good provision at the margin. We hence
eliminate the incentives of governments to design a lump-sum tax synthetically in order
to exclude the interesting but perhaps not very realistic case discussed above.
We now analyze the outcome of tax competition in a scenario when wage taxation
is constrained and destination-based commodity, source-based capital and origin-based
commodity taxes are in the set of tax instruments. We argue that public good provision
is not (constrained) eﬃcient in the presence of a destination-based commodity tax, a
source-based capital tax and an origin-based commodity tax.
Proposition 5. The Nash equilibrium is ineﬃcient if the lump-sum element of td is
already exhausted and the destination-based commodity tax, the wage tax, the source-
based capital tax and origin-based commodity tax are in the set of available taxes.
Proof. Use  − te = e = 0 in (23) and the proof of Proposition 2. 
The explanation for ineﬃciency of tax competition is that the destination-based
commodity tax is equivalent to a wage tax if the lump-sum element is zero. The
destination-based capital tax does not allow a government to independently control the
savings decision of residents and Proposition 5 shows that this role cannot be adopted
by the source-based capital tax or the origin-based commodity tax. Of course, with
the information given here, this basic insight is related to the discussion of the Nash
equilibrium in wage taxation and production taxes in the previous section. We empha-
size two implications. Firstly, the tax structure in the Nash equilibrium is ineﬃcient
even in the presence of a destination-based commodity tax. Secondly, the destination-
based commodity tax and the wage tax are not eﬃciency generating complements in
a second-best situation.
14Let us now combine the ﬁrst-order conditions of the government which is engaged
in tax competition in ﬁve tax instruments. In a ﬁrst step we derive the tax structure
in tax competition.
Proposition 6. If the wage tax, the source-based capital tax, the origin-based com-
modity tax, the destination-based commodity tax and the residence-based capital tax are
available then the government will not use both the source-based capital tax and the
origin-based commodity tax in the Nash equilibrium.
Proof. It is seen from the relevant ﬁrst-order conditions (8a), (8d) and (8e) that one
replicates equations (11)-(12), since the additional terms that capture the eﬀects of
the destination-based commodity tax are contained in each of the three ﬁrst-order
conditions. It is then straightforward that the source-based capital and the origin-
based commodity tax are not used by the government. 
Proposition 6 corroborates the conjecture of Richter (2000) with respect to commod-
ity taxation namely that the destination-based commodity tax has a distinct allocative
advantage over the origin-based commodity tax, which is therefore not used. The next
Proposition validates that government use of available taxes is eﬃcient.
Proposition 7. When destination-based commodity taxation and wage taxation is
possible and e = 0 then the Nash equilibrium is globally eﬃcient in the presence of
residence-based capital taxation. The destination-based commodity tax and the wage
tax are eﬃciency generating substitutes.
Proof. The proof can be separated in two parts. In a ﬁrst step we combine ﬁrst-order
conditions (8b) and (8a) to form wrLtw + Ltr using to = ts = 0 from Proposition 6.
Dividing the resulting expression trough λ we use (9) and (10) to obtain
t
r [ψ − wφ] − t
wφ − t
dψ = 0. (24)
Next, we form [wrLtd + wpLtr]/λ. Using to = ts = 0, the Slutsky relationship from (9)
and (10) and deﬁning b := qwp/ω we obtain
wr [b − 1]

t























From (2) and the private budget constraint ω = qwp holds under our assumption
that the lump-sum element in td is exhausted. Thus b = 1 and inspection of (24)
and (25) shows that both are equal in the Nash equilibrium. Hence, there is one degree
of freedom for the government to choose the ratio between tw and td in a second-best
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Set of Taxes tw,ts,to tr,ts tr,tw,ts tr,ts,to td,tr,ts,to td,ts



















Constr. eﬃcient no yes yes no yes no
Table 1: Summary of results
situation as required by the second part of the Proposition. In the second step we show
that the tax structures given by (24) and (25) are compatible with global eﬃciency
and evaluate LR = 0. Solving the resulting expression and using the Slutsky equation
we get (24) as required by the ﬁrst part of the Proposition. 
The result also has an intuitive explanation. Governments have a full set of taxes
available that, through the change in the equilibrium levels of ρ and ω, allows to
optimally control both the savings and labor supply decision of the resident. Thus, from
the production eﬃciency theorem, a combination of the destination-based commodity
tax with the wage tax eliminates ineﬃcient forms of decentralized ﬁscal decisions.
The overall conclusion of Proposition 7 thus is that countries have no incentive to
engage in wasteful tax competition in a second-best situation if either destination-based
commodity taxes or labor taxes are available and residence-based capital taxation is
possible additionally.
The results of the present paper can be summarized in three main conclusions [ta-
ble 1]. (i) The restriction to a destination-based commodity tax and a source-based
capital tax does not eliminate ineﬃcient use of taxes in tax competition [case F]. Hence,
commodity tax harmonization and capital tax harmonization are not eﬃciency gener-
ating policy substitutes in this tax scenario. (ii) However, we also have shown that an
appropriate variation of the destination-based commodity and the wage tax allows to
decentralize the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient allocation since, in the presence of (synthetically de-
signed) lump-sum taxation, the government must not control labor and capital supply
decisions. A ﬁrst conclusion in this tax scenario thus is that an appropriate utilization
of destination-based commodity and wage taxation allows a government to eﬀectively
insulate the country against the ﬁscal externalities caused by tax competition, even
16in the absence of residence-based capital taxation. As a second conclusion, residence-
based capital and both destination-based commodity or wage taxation are eﬃciency
generating in second-best situation, since the economic eﬀects of residence-based cap-
ital taxation cannot be replicated by an appropriate variation of a destination-based
commodity tax and a wage tax [case E].
The model also conﬁrms the result of previous contributions, which state that tax
competition does not destroy eﬃciency when residence-based capital taxes are available,
even in the presence of source-based capital taxation [case A vs. case B]. An eﬃcient
allocation is also established if residence-based taxation of capital income is eﬀectively
enforced and wage taxes are optimally set [case C]. The intuition is that the source-
based capital tax falls on labor in the presence of a residence-based capital tax, and, in
analogy to the argument in the previous cases, the government has the necessary set of
tax instruments available to independently control domestic labor and capital supply.
(iii) The result that double taxation of capital income leads to an eﬃcient resource
allocation, however, critically hinges on the assumption that additional taxes do not
exist. We have shown that the source-based capital tax loses its function as an implicit
tax on wage income in the presence of origin-based commodity taxes [case D]. Hence,
whereas we obtain eﬃciency when only both capital taxes exist, the tax competition
equilibrium in three taxes is no longer eﬃcient, even in the presence of residence-based
capital taxes. However, a destination-based commodity or a wage tax would heal that
ineﬃciency and would result in an eﬃcient Nash equilibrium in which production taxes
are not used.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have attempted to clarify the role of factor and commodity taxation for
eﬃciency under tax competition in a uniﬁed framework. In a model that allows for both
commodity and factor taxation, destination-based commodity taxation and residence-
based capital taxation eliminates the negative ﬁscal externalities of tax competition.
The presence of td,tr or tw,tr allows a national government to manipulate the price
wedges in the resident’s budget constraint independently. Hence, labor and capital
supply decisions can be eﬀectively controlled by the government. Since ﬁscal exter-
nalities do not exist, decentral ﬁscal decisions lead to a globally eﬃcient (second-best)
allocation. However, a ﬁrst-best allocation can be decentralized by use of commodity
and wage taxation, even in the absence of residence-based capital taxation, if the initial
capital stock is suﬃcient to ﬁnance public good provision.
17The model also replicates the Bucovetsky and Wilson result that tax competition
in both source- and residence-based capital taxation leads to a constrained eﬃcient al-
location, even in the absence of wage taxation. However, since eﬃciency in three taxes
tr,tw,ts requires that the source-based capital tax is not used, eﬃciency in the Bucov-
etsky and Wilson world requires that wage taxation is harmonized at a rate of zero.
A positive source-based capital tax is not compatible with eﬃciency in the presence of
wage and residence-based capital taxation. Moreover, we have shown that the Bucov-
etsky and Wilson result is sensitive with respect to model extensions. In a framework
that also allows for origin-based commodity taxation governments are not able to con-
trol the price wedges in the resident’s budget constraint independently and the Nash
equilibrium thus is ineﬃcient.
The present analysis suggests that the debate about capital tax competition should
not neglect the role of destination-based commodity taxation. Destination-based com-
modity taxation generally eliminate any tendency for governments to underprovide
public goods if either a wage tax or a residence-based capital tax is also present, and
this result is proved to be robust with respect to the introduction of production taxes.
Since taxes that directly aﬀect prices in the consumer’s budget constraint dominate
origin-based commodity and source-based capital taxes, the latter are not used by a
government. As a result, the present analysis revealed some insights for the struc-
ture of taxation that is useful to eliminate the negative consequences of capital tax
competition.
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